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THE EARLY BIRD WAITS FOR THE WORM:
MAY FEDERAL JUDGMENTS BE REGISTERED
PRIOR TO APPEAL?
Cristina M. Rincon*
The federal registration statute, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1963, permits a
judgment creditor to register his or her judgment in another state by simply
filing a copy of the judgment with the clerk of the registering court.
Registration is permitted when the judgment becomes final by appeal, when
the time to appeal expires, or when the court that entered the judgment
orders registration for good cause shown. The majority of courts have
interpreted good cause as a showing that the judgment debtor lacks assets
in the forum jurisdiction to fulfill the judgment, but possesses substantial
assets in the registering jurisdiction. District courts are split, however, on
whether there must be a pending appeal before registration can be ordered.
Registration gives the judgment creditor power to create a lien on the
judgment debtor’s property in another district. The effect of the registered
judgment depends on a state’s laws regarding liens. Liens in some states
may reach personal property, creating the potential for a registered
judgment to have harsh effects on the debtor’s livelihood and placing
restrictions on the alienability of real property. The posting of a
supersedeas bond can stay the enforcement of a judgment and alleviate the
need for registration.
This Note argues that a judgment creditor should be permitted to register
her judgment without waiting for the judgment debtor to file an appeal.
However, a court should have discretion to consider whether permitting
registration when the judgment debtor has not yet posted a supersedeas
bond would cause irreparable harm to a good faith debtor, and if so, grant
the debtor time to post a bond.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................ 1092
I. GRABBING AT PURSE STRINGS: FEDERAL JUDGMENTS AND THE
ROAD TO ENFORCEMENT AND EXECUTION .................................. 1095
A. Traditional Enforcement of Judgments in Another District
by Separate Action ................................................................ 1096
* J.D. Candidate, 2014, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., 2009, Hunter College,
City University of New York. I would like to thank Professor Marc Arkin for her insight
and guidance. For my mother, in gratitude for her unconditional love and encouragement.

1091

1092

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82

B. The Creation of Registration and the Loophole Created
by Pre-amendment § 1963 .................................................... 1097
1. The Creation of Statutory Registration ............................ 1097
2. The Loophole Created by the “Final by Appeal”
Requirement of Pre-amendment § 1963 ......................... 1098
C. Sewing the Loophole Shut? The 1988 Amendment
to § 1963 ............................................................................... 1100
D. Effects of Registration ............................................................ 1102
1. Creation of a Lien ............................................................ 1102
2. Stays and Bonds ............................................................... 1103
3. The Judgment Debtor’s Side of the Coin ......................... 1107
II. LOOSE ENDS: IS REGISTRATION PERMITTED WHEN AN
APPEAL IS NOT PENDING? ........................................................... 1109
A. Associated Business: The First Case To Apply § 1963 After
the 1988 Amendment ............................................................. 1109
B. The Split .................................................................................. 1111
1. The View That Registration for Good Cause Is Only
Permitted During Pendency of Appeals .......................... 1111
2. The View That Registration for Good Cause Is
Permitted Anytime After Judgment ................................ 1115
C. Courts Have Found Good Cause To Register When the
Judgment Debtor Has Appealed and Failed To Post a
Supersedeas Bond ................................................................. 1117
III. COURTS SHOULD PERMIT A JUDGMENT TO BE REGISTERED FOR
“GOOD CAUSE SHOWN” REGARDLESS OF WHETHER AN APPEAL
IS FILED, BUT NOT BEFORE GIVING THE JUDGMENT DEBTOR
AN OPPORTUNITY TO OBTAIN A STAY BY POSTING A
SUPERSEDEAS BOND .................................................................... 1119
A. Requiring That a Judgment Creditor Wait Until the
Defendant Has Appealed Renders the Good Cause
Language of § 1963 Meaningless and Derogates from the
Purpose of the Amendment ................................................... 1119
B. Permitting Registration Before the Debtor Has an
Opportunity To Post a Supersedeas Bond Can Give a
Judgment Creditor Too Much Security, to the Detriment of
the Judgment Debtor’s Rights ............................................... 1120
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................... 1122
INTRODUCTION
28 U.S.C. § 1963 allows a judgment creditor to “register” her judgment
in a foreign jurisdiction merely by filing a certified copy of the judgment in
that district.1 A registered judgment has “the same effect as a judgment of
the district court of the district where registered and may be enforced in like

1. See 28 U.S.C. § 1963 (2006).
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manner.”2 Section 1963 was enacted to enable judgment creditors to use
the ordinary process of executing on the judgment debtor’s property in any
district where the judgment has been registered.3 It provides a judgment
creditor with an alternative method of enforcing a lawsuit, other than the
traditional means of initiating a second lawsuit.4
In its current form, 28 U.S.C. § 1963 provides, “A judgment in an action
for the recovery of money or property . . . may be registered . . . when the
judgment has become final by appeal or expiration of the time for appeal or
when ordered by the court that entered the judgment for good cause
shown.”5 Prior to 1988, however, the statute permitted registration in only
two scenarios: “when the judgment has become final by appeal or
expiration of the time for appeal.”6 The language permitting registration on
a showing of “good cause” was added in 1988 to avoid an anomalous result,
which arose from the statute’s interaction with Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 62(d).7
Rule 62(d) requires a judgment debtor to post a supersedeas bond if she
wishes to obtain a stay of proceedings pending appeal beyond the fourteenday automatic stay granted by Rule 62(a).8 A supersedeas bond is a bond
filed with the court to secure a judgment creditor’s ability to collect her
judgment, and to prevent loss from the stay of execution.9 A supersedeas
bond also serves the judgment debtor’s interests, enabling her to avoid the
hardship of executions on property or “the sometimes impossible task of
recouping transferred assets if there is a reversal on appeal.”10 Ordinarily,
the amount of the bond should be sufficient to satisfy the judgment in full,
plus interest and costs.11 If an appellant does not post a supersedeas bond,
2. Id.
3. See S. REP. NO. 83-1917, at 1 (1954).
4. See infra Part I.A.
5. 28 U.S.C. § 1963.
6. 28 U.S.C. § 1963 (1982) (amended 1988).
7. See Associated Bus. Tel. Sys. Corp. v. Greater Capital Corp., 128 F.R.D. 63, 65
(D.N.J. 1989); Court Reform and Access to Justice Act: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on
Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Admin. of Justice of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th
Cong. 6, 44 (1987) [hereinafter House Subcommittee Hearings] (statement of Hon. Elmo B.
Hunter, Chairman, Judicial Conference of the United States); Hershel Shanks & Steven A.
Standiford, Schizophrenia in Federal Judgment Enforcement: Registration of Foreign
Judgments Under 28 U.S.C. § 1963, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 851, 855–56 (1984).
8. Until 2009, Rule 62(a) only provided a ten-day automatic stay. See FED. R. CIV. P.
62(a) & advisory committee’s note. The previous rules for calculating the ten-day period
also differed in that they did not include weekends. See 16A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL.,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3950.4 (4th ed. 2012).
9. Wilmer v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 844 F. Supp. 1414, 1417 (D. Kan. 1993) (quoting
Miami Int’l Realty Co. v. Paynter, 807 F.2d 871, 873 (10th Cir. 1986)), aff’d, 28 F.3d 114
(10th Cir. 1994).
10. See Thunder Mountain Custom Cycles, Inc. v. Thiessen Prods., Inc., No. 06-CV02527-PAB-BNB, 2008 WL 5412469, at *4 (D. Colo. Dec. 24, 2008) (quoting Ascher v.
Gutierrez, 66 F.R.D. 548, 549 (D.D.C. 1975)); Phansalkar v. Andersen Weinroth & Co., 211
F.R.D. 197, 201–03 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); see also Gauthier v. Mardi Capital Corp., 90 CIV.
4313(CSH), 1990 WL 250179, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 26, 1990) (holding that a supersedeas
bond “liberat[es an] appellant’s property from enforcement of the judgment”).
11. See Popular Grove Planting & Ref. Co., Inc. v. Bache Halsey Stuart, Inc., 600 F.2d
1189, 1191 (5th Cir. 1979).
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the judgment creditor can begin enforcement proceedings after the fourteenday automatic stay period, despite the pending appeal.12
Prior to the 1988 amendment of § 1963, courts applying the literal
language of § 1963 only permitted registration when the judgment was
“final by appeal or expiration of time for appeal.”13 A judgment debtor
could appeal, and as long as the appeal was pending, the judgment creditor
was unable to register the judgment, as it was not yet “final.” As such, a
judgment debtor was able to effectively override the Rule 62(d) bond
requirement. The “final by appeal” requirement of § 1963 allowed the
debtor to delay or avoid payment by transferring his assets to another
jurisdiction while the appeal was pending.14 In this manner, a debtor
secured a “de facto” stay of the proceedings.15
The 1988 amendment sought to rectify this problem by allowing the
court that entered the judgment to authorize registration on a showing of
“good cause.”16 However, courts are split on whether it is premature for a
plaintiff to move for registration after the fourteen-day automatic stay
provided by Rule 62(a),17 but before the judgment debtor has appealed.
The Eastern District of Missouri,18 the Northern District of Illinois,19 and
the District of Idaho20 have found that the judgment debtor must appeal
before registration can be permitted. In contrast, the District of Columbia,21
the Eastern District of Virginia,22 the Eastern District of Pennsylvania,23
and the Southern District of New York24 have all permitted registration

12. See In re Fed. Facilities Realty Trust, 227 F.2d 651, 654 (7th Cir. 1955) (“From the
inception of the federal judiciary, a judgment could be executed while an appeal therefrom
was pending unless timely application was made by the appellant to the trial court or to a
judge or justice of the appellate tribunal for a stay.”); In re Lewis Jones, Inc., 369 F. Supp.
111, 116 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (“Absent the grant of a stay or injunction and the approval of a
bond, the status quo of the litigation is not fixed and the litigation is free to continue.”).
13. See 28 U.S.C. § 1963 (1982) (amended 1988).
14. See Shanks & Standiford, supra note 7, at 855–56.
15. See Associated Bus. Tel. Sys. Corp. v. Greater Capital Corp., 128 F.R.D. 63, 66
(D.N.J. 1989).
16. See 28 U.S.C. § 1963 (2006).
17. See FED. R. CIV. P. 62(a); infra Part I.D.2.
18. See Educ. Emps. Credit Union v. Mut. Guar. Corp., 154 F.R.D. 233, 235 (E.D. Mo.
1994).
19. See Generica Ltd. v. Pharm. Basics, Inc., No. 95 C 5935, 1996 WL 535321, at *10
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 18, 1996), aff’d, 125 F.3d 1123 (7th Cir. 1997).
20. See Blaine Larsen Processing, Inc. v. Hapco Farms, Inc., Civ. No. 97-0212-E-BLW,
2000 WL 35539979, at *14 (D. Idaho Aug. 9, 2000).
21. See Spray Drift Task Force v. Burlington Bio-Med. Corp., 429 F. Supp. 2d 49, 51
(D.D.C. 2006).
22. See E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., Civil Action No.
3:09cv058, 2012 WL 1203327, at *2–3 (E.D. Va. Apr. 10, 2012).
23. See Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Stephens, Civil Action No. 04-3642, 2006 WL 2349991,
at *2 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 11, 2006); Garden State Tanning, Inc. v. Mitchell Mfg. Grp., Inc., No.
CIV.A. 98-4789, 2000 WL 1201372, at *1–2 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 4, 2000).
24. See Commonwealth Assocs. v. Palomar Med. Tech., No. 96 CIV. 1868 HB MHD,
1997 WL 304905, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 6, 1997); Notice of Appeal by Palomar Med. Tech.
from Judgment Order, Commonwealth Assocs., 1:96CV01868, ECF No. 41.
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before the defendant appealed. Additionally, the Tenth Circuit,25 the
District of Maryland, the Northern District of California,26 the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania,27 the Eastern District of Tennessee,28 the Northern
District of Illinois,29 and the D.C. District Court30 have addressed motions
to register a judgment after an appeal had been filed. These courts noted
that the defendants’ failure to post a supersedeas bond was at least part of
the reason the court found good cause to register. These cases illustrate the
usefulness of giving a judgment debtor an opportunity to post a bond before
permitting registration.
Part I of this Note explains the traditional method of enforcing a
judgment in a foreign jurisdiction by a second action on the judgment. It
outlines the purpose of enacting § 1963, as well as the anomalous result
created by the “final by appeal” language of the original statute. This Part
then describes the 1988 amendment, which attempted to remedy the issue
by introducing the “good cause” language.
Part II discusses the conflict between district courts on whether the
judgment debtor needs to commence an appeal before the judgment can be
registered. Part III argues that, in the context of a motion for registration
prior to an appeal, a creditor should not have to wait until the debtor
appeals, but the debtor should at least be given an opportunity to post a
supersedeas bond while the case is on appeal.
I. GRABBING AT PURSE STRINGS: FEDERAL JUDGMENTS AND THE ROAD
TO ENFORCEMENT AND EXECUTION
Part I.A discusses the traditional method of enforcing a federal judgment
in a foreign district by means of a second action on a judgment. Part I.B
discusses the enactment of 28 U.S.C. § 1963, which sought to streamline
enforcement procedures by permitting a judgment creditor to register her
judgment in a foreign jurisdiction by filing a certified copy of the judgment
in that district. It also considers the issues created by the literal application
of the “final by appeal” language of the original statute. Part I.C introduces
the 1988 amendment to § 1963, which sought to remedy the issues created
by the “final by appeal language” by permitting the court that entered the
judgment to order registration for “good cause” shown. Part I.D explains
the effects of a registered judgment, and what enforcement means for both
the judgment debtor and creditor.

25. See In re Steel Reclamation Res., Inc., No. 94-6396, 1995 WL 495272, at *3 (10th
Cir. Aug. 21, 1995).
26. See Funai Elec. Co. v. Daewoo Elecs. Corp., No. C-04-1830 JCS, 2009 WL 605840,
at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2009).
27. See Henkels & McCoy, Inc. v. Adochio, No. Civ.A. 94-3958, 1997 WL 535899, at
*2 (E.D. Pa. July 31, 1997).
28. See DuVoisin v. Avery (In re S. Indus. Banking Corp.), 121 B.R. 229, 230 (Bankr.
E.D. Tenn. 1990).
29. See First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Polonitza, No. 88 C 2998, 1991 WL 2408, at *2
(N.D. Ill. Jan. 4, 1991).
30. See Johns v. Rozet, 143 F.R.D. 11, 12–13 (D.D.C. 1992).
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A. Traditional Enforcement of Judgments in Another District
by Separate Action
Prior to the enactment of 28 U.S.C. § 1963, a federal judgment could
only be enforced in a foreign jurisdiction through a separate action in that
jurisdiction.31 The use of a second action still remains available as an
alternative to registration,32 however, it is less efficient than using the
registration statute. The second proceeding is often costly,33 and may
require hiring an attorney in the foreign jurisdiction.34 It “is subject to the
same overcrowded calendars and dilatory activity by the defendants that
was possible in the first action.”35 It may also be “inadequate, given the
high mobility today of both persons and their property.”36 Given that it is
independent action, it requires that the foreign court obtain personal
jurisdiction over the debtor.37 This can be difficult, especially if the only
ties the debtor has with the foreign jurisdiction are her assets there.38 The
creditor will first need to find the debtor’s property to establish personal
jurisdiction.39
Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit held in Kaplan v. Hirsh that an
independent action is not a true alternative to registration.40 The Kaplan
district court had denied the judgment creditor’s application for
registration,41 and explained that the independent action would provide an
alternative means of securing the judgment.42 On appeal, the Fourth Circuit
denounced this logic as flawed because an independent action in a second
jurisdiction is not always available. The court thought that this case was “a
perfect example.”43 The creditor could not find the debtor in the foreign

31. See Home Port Rentals, Inc. v. Int’l Yachting Grp., Inc., 252 F.3d 399, 404 (5th Cir.
2001); Shanks & Standiford, supra note 7, at 857–58.
32. The creditor could bring the new action under either a debt theory or an action of
indebitatus assumpsit. Note, Registration of Federal Judgments, 42 IOWA L. REV. 285, 285
(1957).
33. See Juneau Spruce Corp. v. Int’l Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s Union, 128 F.
Supp. 697, 700 (D. Haw. 1955) (“28 U.S.C. § 1963 was designed to relieve both creditors
and debtors from the additional cost and harassment of further litigation which otherwise
would be incident to an action on the judgment in a foreign district.”).
34. See Shanks & Standiford, supra note 7, at 858.
35. Note, supra note 32, at 286.
36. See ITT Indus. Credit Co. v. Lawco Energy, Inc., 86 F.R.D. 708, 711 (S.D. W. Va.
1980).
37. See Shanks & Standiford, supra note 7, at 858.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Kaplan v. Hirsh, 91 F.R.D. 106, 107 (D. Md. 1981).
41. Id. The case was decided under an older version of § 1963 that only permitted
registration where the judgment “has become final by appeal or expiration of time for
appeal.” 28 U.S.C. § 1963 (1982) (amended 1988). An appeal was pending, therefore under
the express terms of the statute, registration was not permitted. Id.
42. Kaplan, 91 F.R.D. at 110.
43. Kaplan v. Hirsh, 696 F.2d 1046, 1048 n.3 (4th Cir.), withdrawn, 765 F.2d 421 (4th
Cir. 1982). A subsequent order dismissed the appeal as moot, noting that the panel opinion
was vacated due to a grant of a petition for rehearing en banc. See Shanks & Standiford,
supra note 7, at 865 n.43.
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jurisdiction, and therefore could not properly serve him there.44 The
independent action remedy recommended by the Kaplan district court was
thus unavailable to the creditor because he was unable to initiate a suit
against the debtor’s assets in the foreign jurisdiction.45
B. The Creation of Registration and the Loophole Created
by Pre-amendment § 1963
Part I.B.1 introduces 28 U.S.C. § 1963 and explains the purpose of the
registration mechanism. Part I.B.2 explains how the literal application of
§ 1963’s “final by appeal” requirement in the original statute overrode
Rule 62(d)’s supersedeas bond requirement, thus giving unscrupulous
judgment debtors an opportunity to appeal without posting a bond, and
allowing them to secure additional time to hide or dissipate assets.
1. The Creation of Statutory Registration
28 U.S.C § 1963 was drafted in 1948 for the purpose of “provid[ing]
litigants with a ‘streamline’ [sic] approach to enforcing judgments” and
preventing duplicative litigation.46 Registration relieves both parties of the
costs and burdens of a second litigation.47 Prior to its 1988 amendment, the
statute did not permit registration on a showing of good cause, but instead
only when the judgment was “final by appeal or expiration of time for
appeal.”48 This “final by appeal” language prevented registration as long as
there was an appeal pending in the upper court or the time to appeal had not
yet expired.
A literal interpretation of the statutory language effectively overrode
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62’s bond requirement.49 The literal “final
by appeal or time for appeal” language meant that the court could not
authorize registration until the appellate process was exhausted, thereby
granting a judgment debtor a de facto stay of the proceedings.50 Thus, even
if the debtor did not post a bond while the appeal was pending, he could
“delay or escape payment by transferring his assets to another jurisdiction
during the appeal.”51 Unscrupulous judgment debtors took advantage of
the strict statutory language, and most courts’ literal interpretation of it, by

44. Kaplan, 696 F.2d at 1048 n.3.
45. Id.
46. Associated Bus. Tel. Sys. Corp. v. Greater Capital Corp., 128 F.R.D. 63, 65 (D.N.J.
1989); see also Stanford v. Utley, 341 F.2d 265, 270 (8th Cir. 1965) (“[T]he purposes of
§ 1963 were to simplify and facilitate the enforcement of federal judgments, at least those for
money, to eliminate the necessity and expense of a second lawsuit, and to avoid the
impediments, such as diversity of citizenship, which new and distinct federal litigation might
otherwise encounter.” (citations omitted)).
47. See S. REP. NO. 83-1917, at 1 (1954); supra notes 32–45.
48. 28 U.S.C. § 1963 (1982) (amended 1988) (emphasis added).
49. Associated Bus., 128 F.R.D. at 66.
50. Id.
51. Shanks & Standiford, supra note 7, at 855–56 (emphasis added).
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appealing to secure extra time to dispose of their assets.52 This left a
judgment creditor unable to execute on his or her judgment.53
2. The Loophole Created by the “Final by Appeal” Requirement
of Pre-amendment § 1963
Prior to the 1988 amendment, six of the seven reported cases where
courts addressed registration under § 1963 while an appeal was pending
read the “final by appeal” language strictly. Those six courts denied
registration while the defendant’s appeal was pending.54
Abegglen v. Burnham was the first of the seven cases where the court
considered a § 1963 motion for registration.55 Defendants had appealed
without posting a supersedeas bond, and the plaintiff moved for
registration.56 The District of Utah held that the plain meaning of “final by
appeal” should govern, and until the appeal and judgment were settled, it
was not final.57 The court expressed concern for the defendant’s rights,
noting that granting registration would force the defendant to hire counsel
in each district the judgment was registered in, thus subjecting him to
“annoyance and oppression.”58
The only reported case to permit registration pursuant to § 1963 while an
appeal was pending was Dorey v. Dorey,59 from the Northern District of
Alabama.60 In Dorey, a judgment was entered against the defendant in
California, and the defendant subsequently moved to Alabama.61 The
plaintiff brought a suit in the Northern District of Alabama to enforce the
judgment under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution.
The defendant appealed to the Fifth Circuit without posting a supersedeas
bond and moved yet again to Texas.62 The plaintiff filed a motion in the
Alabama district court to permit registration in Texas.63
Though the appeal on the first action was still pending in the Fifth
Circuit, the Alabama district court permitted registration because it found

52. See infra Part I.B.2.
53. For one example of a judgment debtor attempting to evade payment by taking
advantage of the de facto stay provided by pre-amendment § 1963, see Dorey v. Dorey, 77
F.R.D. 721 (N.D. Ala. 1978). See also infra notes 59–69 and accompanying text.
54. See Air Transp. Ass’n of Am. v. Prof’l Air Traffic Controllers Org. (In re PATCO),
699 F.2d 539 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Urban Indus., Inc. v. Thevis, 670 F.2d 981 (11th Cir. 1982);
Kaplan v. Hirsh, 91 F.R.D. 106 (D. Md. 1981); Goldsmith v. Midwest Energy Co., 90 F.R.D.
249 (N.D. Ohio 1980); Lipton v. Schmertz, 68 F.R.D. 249 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Abegglen v.
Burnham, 94 F. Supp. 484 (D. Utah 1950).
55. Abegglen, 94 F. Supp. at 485.
56. See id. at 485.
57. Id. at 486.
58. Id.
59. 77 F.R.D. 721 (N.D. Ala. 1978).
60. The Eleventh Circuit, however, later disagreed in Urban Industries, Inc. v. Thevis,
impliedly overruling Dorey. See Urban Indus., Inc. v. Thevis, 670 F.2d 981, 984–85 (11th
Cir. 1982).
61. See Dorey, 77 F.R.D. at 721–22; see also Shanks & Standiford, supra note 7, at 862.
62. See Dorey, 77 F.R.D. at 722.
63. Id.
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that it would be unconstitutional to stay the enforcement where no bond had
been posted.64 The court reasoned that “[§ 1963] should be interpreted in
pari materia with F.R.C.P. 62, and that the statute must be read as assuming
an appeal with supersedeas.”65 The court stated that there was a
constitutional right—unless a stay has been issued—for a judgment creditor
to collect his or her judgment,66 and cited five constitutional principles that
would be violated by requiring that a judgment be “final by appeal” before
it could be registered, as the literal interpretation of § 1963 would require.67
Obviously annoyed with the defendant’s efforts to avoid payment of the
judgment, the court declared, “To allow this defendant to obtain an
automatic stay by simply moving across the district line would amount to
an injustice of such enormity as to offend the conscience of this court.”68
The court presumed that the legislature could not have intended this result
when it enacted § 1963.69 After Dorey, there were no other reported cases
that permitted registration while the defendant’s appeal was pending.70
Dorey’s constitutional argument was later evaluated and criticized by the
District of Maryland in Kaplan v. Hirsch.71 In Kaplan, the court
determined that the Dorey court had relied on the invalid premise that the
only means of executing a judgment in a foreign district was by
registration.72 The court explained that failure to register did not prevent
execution—the plaintiff always had the option of executing on the
judgment by means of an independent action—therefore, there was no
constitutional violation.73 The court also found it entirely logical that
Congress would limit the application of § 1963 to cases where the judgment
was final by appeal—a streamlined mechanism for enforcement only made
sense where there was no risk of reversal on appeal, and collateral attack
was limited.74 It is notable that the district court in Kaplan was not dealing
64. Id.
65. Id. at 723. This view against reading § 1963 without reference to the other Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure is shared by at least one other court:
[The Rules] would permit a judgment creditor to levy against assets of his
judgment debtor, unless supersedeas bond were posted, while [28 U.S.C. § 1963]
would prevent the same, bond or no bond. There is no sense to be found in such
an incongruity, and in light of the policy in the federal courts against unsecured
stays of execution, no justice either.
ITT Indus. Credit Co. v. Lawco Energy, Inc., 86 F.R.D. 708, 712 (S.D. W. Va. 1980)
(citations omitted).
66. See Dorey, 77 F.R.D. at 723.
67. See id. at 725–26. The five principles are privileges and immunities, equal
protection, due process, separation of powers, and full faith and credit. Id. For an interesting
discussion and criticism of the Alabama District Court’s reasoning, see Shanks & Standiford,
supra note 7, at 863 (criticizing the court’s claim that the literal application of the “final by
appeal” language violated the Constitution and concluding that while the court reached a just
result, it did so by ignoring the plain meaning of the statute).
68. Dorey, 77 F.R.D. at 723.
69. Id.
70. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
71. Kaplan v. Hirsh, 91 F.R.D. 106, 108 (D. Md. 1981).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 109.
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with a judgment debtor who appeared to be evading payment, as was the
judgment debtor in Dorey.75
C. Sewing the Loophole Shut? The 1988 Amendment to § 1963
Section 1963 was amended in 198876 to remedy the issues created by the
“final by appeal” language.77 The Judiciary Committee recognized that
courts’ literal interpretation of the original statute had the potential to
prevent judgment creditors from enforcing their judgments until after the
appeal process had finished. Meanwhile, the judgment debtor could secure
time to dissipate her assets since she was able to obviate the Rule 62(d)
bond requirement.78 The Judiciary Committee’s proposed remedy was to
also allow the court that entered the judgment to order registration for
“good cause shown.”79 The following section discusses how courts have
interpreted “good cause” and the requirements imposed on judgment
creditors for proving that “good cause” exists to permit registration.
Section 1963 does not articulate what constitutes “good cause” to register
a judgment in a foreign jurisdiction,80 nor does the legislative history give
an explanation of what the standard of review should be for “good cause.”81
During the hearings for the bill in which the § 1963 amendment was
introduced, the Honorable Elmo B. Hunter, Chairman of the Court
Administration Committee of the Judicial Conference, indicated that the
purpose of the amendment was to prevent a judgment debtor from hiding
assets in a foreign jurisdiction.82 Judge Hunter recognized that the literal
application of § 1963 had the potential to permit a judgment debtor time to
dissipate assets by circumventing Rule 62’s bond requirement. Thus, the
Judicial Conference recommended that the “good cause” language be added
to prevent judgment debtors from taking advantage of the de facto stay.83
75. See Dorey v. Dorey, 77 F.R.D. 721, 721–22 (N.D. Ala. 1978); see also Shanks &
Standiford, supra note 7, at 864.
76. Congress passed the amendment as part of the Judicial Improvement and Access to
Justice Act, a relatively unpublicized statute, which contained a variety of improvements
from the Judicial Committee. Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat 4642 (1988); Note, supra note
32, at 287 & n.13; see also 28 U.S.C.A § 1963 cmt. (West 2006); Associated Bus. Tel. Sys.
Corp. v. Greater Capital Corp., 128 F.R.D. 63, 65 (D.N.J. 1989).
77. See House Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 7, at 44–45; supra Part I.B.
78. See House Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 7, at 44–45 (“Although these
circumstances do not often occur, the Judicial Conference concluded that a judgment debtor
should not be permitted to hide assets in a foreign jurisdiction . . . .”); see also Chi. Downs
Ass’n v. Chase, 944 F.2d 366, 371 (7th Cir. 1991) (“[T]he good cause language ‘entered the
statute in 1988 to deal with the anomaly that a judgment for which no supersedeas bond had
been posted was enforceable during appeal only in the rendering district.’” (quoting Pac.
Reinsurance Mgmt. Corp. v. Fabe, 929 F.2d 1215, 1218 (7th Cir. 1991))).
79. 28 U.S.C. § 1963 (2006); see also House Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 7, at
45 (“[T]he district court entering the judgment should be given discretion to permit
registration in a foreign jurisdiction pending appeal, but only upon a showing of good
cause.”).
80. See 28 U.S.C. § 1963.
81. See generally House Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 7.
82. Id. at 6, 44–45.
83. Id.
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Notably, the U.S. Department of Justice also submitted its remarks to the
House Subcommittee, supporting the proposal for the new language, but
finding that it did not “go far enough.”84 The Department of Justice
suggested that a judgment creditor be able to register a judgment for cause
in another district without special approval from the court that entered the
judgment.85 This proposal was not discussed further, and the statute was
enacted giving only the court that entered the judgment authority to order
registration for “good cause shown.”86
The commentary to the 1988 amendment, written by David D. Siegel87
and published in 1989, gives examples of when a court should find “good
cause” and permit registration.88 Professor Siegel wrote that “good cause”
would obviously include a showing that the defendant planned to move
property outside the district. But demonstrating that a defendant was
planning to do so would place an unfair evidentiary burden on a judgment
creditor, especially considering that she had already prevailed on her claim
at the trial level.89 Given that burden, Professor Siegel suggested that “[t]he
court should have leeway . . . to permit the registration on . . . a mere
showing . . . that the defendant has substantial property in the other district
and insufficient in the rendering district to satisfy the judgment.”90
The majority of courts facing motions to register pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1963 have followed Professor Siegel’s commentary, and held that “good
cause” is found where the defendant does not possess assets in the home
district but does possess assets in another jurisdiction (“the assets test”).91
A few courts have also held that the combination of the assets test and the
judgment debtor’s failure to post a supersedeas bond creates “good cause”
to register the judgment.92 A judgment creditor cannot request registration
in any district she wishes; the judgment creditor must show that the
judgment debtor possesses significant assets in a particular district or
districts. Courts typically only allow the creditor to register in those

84. See id. at 249–50 (statement of Stephen J. Markman, Assistant Att’y Gen. of the
United States, Office of Legal Policy).
85. Id.
86. See 28 U.S.C. § 1963 (2006).
87. David Siegel, Distinguished Professor of Law Emeritus at the Albany Law School, is
a prolific and highly regarded legal commentator, best known in New York for his monthly
legal analysis publication Siegel’s Practice Review. See Patrick M. Connors, The King of
New York Practice, 72 ALB. L. REV. 447, 447–50 (2009). Professor Siegel has also written
extensive commentaries in McKinney’s New York Laws and in the U.S. Code Annotated.
See About the Author, SIEGEL’S PRAC. REV., http://www.siegelspracticereview.com/05auth/
index.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2013).
88. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1963 cmt. (West 2006).
89. Id.
90. Id.; see also Blaine Larsen Processing, Inc. v. Hapco Farms, Inc., Civ. No. 97-0212E-BLW, 2000 WL 35539979, at *15 (D. Idaho Aug. 9, 2000).
91. See, e.g., AT & T Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Enters. of Pa., Inc., No. 98CIV6133LAP, 1999
WL 672543, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 1999); Ind.-Mich. Corp. v. Sisk Fertilizer-Lime Serv.,
Inc., 89 C 2735, 1992 WL 159150, at *1 (N.D. Ill. June 29, 1992).
92. See infra Part II.C.
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districts where a showing of substantial assets that would satisfy the
judgment has been made.93
For instance, in Fasolino Foods Co. v. Banca Nazionale Del Lavoro, the
Southern District of New York, when it approved the judgment creditor’s
§ 1963 motion, restricted the registration to New Jersey, as that was the
only jurisdiction in which the creditor had established that the debtor held
assets.94 In Dyll v. Adams, the Northern District of Texas denied the
plaintiff’s motion for registration because the two defendants offered
evidence that they were insolvent.95 One had no known assets and was no
longer doing business, and the other stated that he was either “virtually
broke or that his assets [were] subject to a domestic relations order that
regulates asset transfers.”96 There were no “substantial assets” for the
plaintiff to register against. The court dismissed the motion to register
without prejudice, to allow the plaintiffs to meet their obligation to
introduce evidence that refuted the defendants’ claims.97
D. Effects of Registration
Part I.D.1 explains the process and effect of the enforcement of
judgments, including execution through the use of liens. Part I.D.2 explains
the requirements and procedures for staying the enforcement of a judgment
during an appeal or postjudgment motions. Part I.D.3 discusses the rare
situation where a court has permitted a judgment debtor to retroactively stay
the enforcement of a judgment and vacate the levies against the judgment
debtor when the debtor posts a supersedeas bond and demonstrates that she
is suffering from the levies.
1. Creation of a Lien
A judgment registered pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1963 “shall have the same
effect as a judgment of the district court of the district where registered and
may be enforced in like manner.”98 The statute enables a judgment creditor
to create a lien on the judgment debtor’s property in another district. A lien
is “[a] legal right or interest that a creditor has in another’s property, lasting
usually until a debt or duty that it secures is satisfied.”99
93. See Dyll v. Adams, No. CIV.A. 3:91-CV-2734D, 1998 WL 60541, at *2 (N.D. Tex.
Feb. 6, 1998); Jack Frost Labs., Inc. v. Physicians & Nurses Mfg. Corp., 951 F. Supp. 51, 52
(S.D.N.Y. 1997); Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass’n of Am. v. Ormesa Geothermal, No. 87 Civ.
1259 (KMW), 1991 WL 254573, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 1991); Fasolino Foods Co. v.
Banca Nazionale Del Lavoro, No. 90 CIV. 334(JMC), 1991 WL 107440, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.
June 7, 1991). The court in Residential Funding Co. v. Terrace Mortgage Co. required a
lesser showing, and permitted registration in the judicial districts in which defendant’s assets
were “likely to be found.” Residential Funding Co. v. Terrace Mortg. Co., Civil No. 09-3455
(SRN/AJB), 2013 WL 235905, at *1 (D. Minn. Jan. 22, 2013).
94. Fasolino, 1991 WL 107440, at *2.
95. Dyll, 1998 WL 60541, at *2.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. 28 U.S.C. § 1963 (2006).
99. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1006 (9th ed. 2009).
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The actual effect of registration varies from state to state, as the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure adopt local state law for lien governance.100 The
reach of a state’s laws on liens defines the reach of the federal judgment.101
Some states permit liens to attach to personal property if certain procedural
steps are taken.102 For instance, in New York, a money judgment can be
enforced against any property that can be “assigned or transferred”
including property that is acquired after the judgment, or that consists of a
future interest that is not yet vested.103 New York also permits execution
against personal property, subject to numerous exceptions.104 Liens can
affect the goodwill of a business, as they are public records and are
routinely monitored by credit rating services and published in real estate
journals. Thus, a registered judgment could potentially have harsh effects
on the debtor’s livelihood and alienability of real property.105
2. Stays and Bonds
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62(a) provides that proceedings to
enforce a judgment may not begin until fourteen days after the entry of
judgment.106 The automatic stay gives a judgment debtor time to decide
whether to take advantage of the available postjudgment motions or
remedies, such as filing an appeal.107 After that time, a judgment debtor
may obtain a stay by posting a supersedeas bond with the court.108 A
supersedeas bond is a bond filed with the court to protect the creditor from
loss while the matter is on appeal.109 Many courts require the debtor to post
a supersedeas bond during the pendency of her posttrial motions to preserve
the status quo.110 Stays on appeal by supersedeas bond are a matter of

100. See 28 U.S.C. § 1962; 28 U.S.C.A. § 1963 cmt. (West 2006).
101. Id.
102. See id. The procedural steps may be relatively straightforward. For example, in
Iowa, a lien on personal property is created “[b]y the officer taking possession of the
property, and signing and appending to the execution its exact description at length, with the
date of the levy.” IOWA R. CIV. P. 1.1020(1); see Jim White Agency, Inc. v. Clark, 489
N.W.2d 26, 28 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992) (“No lien is created on personal property . . . until the
procedural steps required under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure [1.1020] have been taken.”).
103. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5201(b) (McKinney Supp. 2013).
104. See id. R. 5205.
105. See infra notes 151–58 and accompanying text.
106. See FED. R. CIV. P. 62(a). Prior to 2009, the statute provided a ten-day automatic
stay. See FED. R. CIV. P. 62 advisory committee’s note.
107. See United States v. One 1962 Ford Galaxie Sedan, 41 F.R.D. 156, 157 (S.D.N.Y.
1966).
108. See FED. R. CIV. P. 62(d).
109. Wilmer v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 844 F. Supp. 1414, 1417 (D. Kan. 1993) (quoting
Miami Int’l Realty Co. v. Paynter, 807 F.2d 871, 873 (10th Cir. 1986)), aff’d, 28 F.3d 114
(10th Cir. 1994).
110. See, e.g., Lewis v. United Joint Venture, No. 1:07-CV-639, 2009 WL 1654600, at *1
(W.D. Mich. June 10, 2009); Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Miell, No. C04-0142, 2008 WL
746604, at *2 (N.D. Iowa Mar. 19, 2008); Int’l Wood Processors v. Power Dry, Inc., 102
F.R.D. 212, 215 (D.S.C. 1984).
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right,111 though it is up to a state to determine whether there is a right of
review in an appellate court.112
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4 requires that an appeal be made
within thirty days after the judgment is entered or the order appealed.113
There are, however, six motions that if filed timely, will toll the time to file
an appeal in a civil case.114 Under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure
4(a)(4)(A), “the time to file an appeal runs for all parties from the entry of
the order disposing of the last such remaining motion.”115 The court may
also stay the execution of the judgment pending the disposition of five of
the tolling motions, but the stay must be “[o]n appropriate terms for the
opposing party’s security.”116 What constitutes appropriate terms is up to
the court’s discretion.117
The Sixth Circuit has held that filing a bond is not the only way to obtain
a stay.118 Arban v. West Publishing Corp. established that a court may
exercise its discretion to grant a stay.119 At the very least, the judgment
debtor would need to demonstrate that it has sufficient assets to satisfy a
bond.120 The District of Kansas has agreed, emphasizing that the court has
discretion to determine whether a creditor’s interests can be protected
without a bond.121
After the fourteen-day automatic stay period has lapsed, a judgment
creditor can initiate enforcement or execution of the judgment, unless the
court has stayed the enforcement pending a postjudgment motion, or the
judgment debtor has stayed the execution by posting a bond. Failure to post
a bond will still permit the judgment debtor to appeal, but without a bond
the judgment debtor runs the risk that the creditor will enforce the judgment

111. See Fed. Prescription Serv., Inc. v. Am. Pharm. Ass’n, 636 F.2d 755, 757–58 (D.C.
Cir. 1980).
112. See Kohl v. Lehlback, 160 U.S. 293, 299 (1895).
113. See FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(1)(A).
114. See id. R. 4(a)(4)(A). The six motions are:
(i) for judgment under Rule 50(b); (ii) to amend or make additional factual
findings under Rule 52(b), whether or not granting the motion would alter the
judgment; (iii) for attorney’s fees under Rule 54 if the district court extends the
time to appeal under Rule 58; (iv) to alter or amend the judgment under Rule 59;
(v) for a new trial under Rule 59; or (vi) for relief under Rule 60 if the motion is
filed no later than 28 days after the judgment is entered.
Id. Rule 50(b)’s motion for judgment as a matter of law, Rule 52(b)’s motion to amend or
make additional factual findings, and Rule 59’s motions for a new trial and motions to alter
or amend a judgment all require that the motion be filed no later than twenty-eight days after
the entry of judgment. See FED. R. CIV. P. 50(b); id. R. 52(b); id. R. 59(b), (e).
115. FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(4)(A); see also 16A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 8, § 3950.4.
116. See FED. R. CIV. P. 62(d).
117. See Ireland v. Dodson, No. 07-4082-JAR, 2009 WL 1559784, at *1 (D. Kan. May
29, 2009).
118. Arban v. W. Pub. Corp., 345 F.3d 390, 409 (6th Cir. 2003).
119. Id.
120. Id. In Arban, the Sixth Circuit found the district court had not abused its discretion
when granting a stay without a bond, because the judgment was for roughly $216,000 and
the judgment debtor’s annual revenue far exceeded that amount. See id. at 400, 409.
121. Ireland, 2009 WL 1559784, at *1.
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while the appeal is pending.122 The bond takes effect when the court
approves it, and the bond should be approved “upon or after filing the
notice of appeal or after obtaining the order allowing the appeal.”123 If the
judgment debtor chooses not to post a bond within this timeframe, she
forgoes the opportunity to prevent registration while her claim is on
appeal.124 The judgment creditor can begin enforcement, including
registering the judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 1963 in a foreign jurisdiction.125
Once enforcement proceedings have begun, the debtor may still post a bond
in the rendering district under Rule 62(d)126 and thereby obtain a stay of
enforcement in both the rendering and foreign districts.127
Depending on state law, the registration may have the effect of creating a
lien. Rule 62(f) provides, “If a judgment is a lien on the judgment debtor’s
property under the law of the state where the court is located, the judgment
debtor is entitled to the same stay of execution the state court would
give.”128 If a judgment results in a lien on the property of the judgment
debtor and the judgment debtor is entitled to a stay under state law, she will
also be entitled to one in the district court.129 However, posting a bond
does not lift the liens created; it merely stays the enforcement.130
If the defendant prevails on appeal, the lien in the registering district can
be lifted by motion.131 As explained in the § 1963 commentary, there is a
more “elementary” way for the judgment debtor to remove the lien.132
After the rendering court receives notice of the reversal, the debtor may
obtain a certificate from the clerk of the rendering court that reflects the
reversal and cancellation of the judgment, and file the certificate in the
foreign district.133
Professor Siegel explains that permitting registration when the defendant
has failed the assets test places only a “modest burden” on the defendant.134
In the current § 1963 commentary, which has been updated since the
passage of the amendment, Professor Siegel points to a District of New
122. See, e.g., Strong v. Laubach, 443 F.3d 1297, 1299 (10th Cir. 2006); Koster & Wythe
v. Massey, 262 F.2d 60, 62 (9th Cir. 1958); Qatar Nat’l Bank v. Winmar, Inc., 813 F. Supp.
2d 163, 169 (D.D.C.), vacated in part, 831 F. Supp. 2d 159 (D.D.C. 2011); Dorey v. Dorey,
77 F.R.D. 721, 723 (N.D. Ala. 1978).
123. FED. R. CIV. P. 62(d).
124. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1963 cmt. (West 2006).
125. See id.
126. FED. R. CIV. P. 62(d).
127. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1963 cmt.
128. See id.
129. See id.; Digital Ally, Inc. v. Z3 Tech., LLC, No. 09-2292-KGS, 2012 WL 2872146,
at *1 (D. Kan. July 12, 2012).
130. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1963 cmt.; see also infra Part I.D.3.
131. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1963 cmt.
132. Id.; see also Whitney Nat’l Bank v. Stack, Civ. A. No. 91-1320, 1992 WL 236920,
at *3 (E.D. La. Sept. 2, 1992) (“[T]he court [does not] believe that removal of foreign
registrations is particularly time consuming or cumbersome—if the [defendants] prevail in
their postjudgment motions or on appeal, they can simply file a motion in the foreign district
for removal pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(5).”).
133. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1963 cmt.
134. Id.; supra Part I.D.
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Jersey case that was decided shortly after the amendment passed, where the
court faced a judgment debtor who only had assets outside of New
Jersey.135 The defendants had not appealed the decision of the trial court,
but had made “numerous” postjudgment motions.136 After an extensive
review of the history of § 1963, the problem caused by the pre-amendment
“final by appeal” language, and an analysis of Professor Siegel’s
commentary, the court found good cause to register because the judgment
creditor might be unable to satisfy her judgment.137
Some courts have permitted registration prior to the judgment debtor’s
appeal even where the judgment debtor’s time to appeal has not expired.138
The logic behind permitting registration before the judgment debtor has
filed an appeal is that it will allow a judgment creditor to secure assets and
thwart any potential efforts of the judgment debtor to delay enforcement
with posttrial motion practice.139
Putting the defendant to that modest burden in the event the judgment is
reversed seems fairer than denying the plaintiff a lien in the other district
during the pendency of the appeal. Denying the lien could mean the loss
of a substantial opportunity to satisfy the judgment, an opportunity the
plaintiff is entitled to after winning at trial and thereby turning in her own
favor all presumptions about the merits of the claim.140

A hypothetical situation illustrates the process where a judgment creditor
moves for registration before an appeal has been filed: in a New York
district court, judgment has been entered and the debtor wishes to make
posttrial motions before taking the option to appeal. She has insufficient
assets to satisfy the judgment in New York but sufficient assets in
California. The judgment creditor moves for registration in California, and
it is granted. The creditor then takes the appropriate steps required by local
state law to turn the judgment into a lien in California (in some states, this
may be as easy as filing the judgment in the registration district).141 The
defendant appeals, posts a supersedeas bond with the New York court, and
stays the enforcement of the judgment in both New York and California.
The lien in California, once created, is not lifted by the posting of a
supersedeas bond. Unless the court is willing to take the rare move to
retroactively stay the enforcement upon the posting of the bond,142 the
debtor will be unable to lift the lien in California until she (1) prevails on
135. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1963 cmt.; Associated Bus. Tel. Sys. Corp. v. Greater Capital
Corp., 128 F.R.D. 63, 68 (D.N.J. 1989).
136. Associated Bus., 128 F.R.D. at 65.
137. Id. at 66–67. Following Professor Siegel’s logic, the court also noted that the
defendants could stay the proceedings by posting a supersedeas bond and, if they succeeded
in reversing the judgment on appeal, simply remove the foreign registrations by motion. Id.
138. See infra Part II.B.2.
139. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1963 cmt.
140. Id.
141. Id. In a court of appeals, a motion for approval of a supersedeas bond must first be
made in the district court, and the moving party must show that it was denied, unless the
party can show that it is impracticable to first move in the district court. See FED. R. APP. P.
8(a)(1)–(2).
142. See infra Part I.D.3.
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appeal and moves to have the judgment lifted, or (2) loses on appeal and
pays the judgment in either court.
A judgment debtor is not always required to post a bond in order to stay
the enforcement of a judgment. While district courts and courts of appeals
are governed by different rules of procedure to stay an order pending
appeal, the conditions are substantially the same.143 A court examines
(1) the applicant’s likelihood of success on the merits, (2) the potential for
injury to the applicant absent a stay, (3) the potential for injury to the other
parties, and (4) the public interest.144
Perhaps the factor with the least obvious meaning is the one requiring a
determination of where the public interest lies. The public has an interest in
having legal questions decided “as correctly and expeditiously as
possible.”145 If maintaining the status quo serves the public interest, a stay
may be granted.146 If the case concerns a matter that affects the public
interest, the private interests of the parties will come second to the interests
of the public.147
3. The Judgment Debtor’s Side of the Coin
Several courts have recognized the harsh effects created by the execution
of judgments on a debtor’s property and livelihood. These courts have
taken an equitable approach that extinguishes levies on property once a
judgment debtor posts sufficient security with an approved supersedeas
bond.148 There are just as many, if not more, that have held the opposite,
143. See Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776 (1987) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 62(c); FED.
R. APP. P. 8(a)).
144. Id. (collecting cases). Other courts have created slightly different standards. See
Accident Fund v. Baerwaldt, 579 F. Supp. 724, 726 & n.4 (W.D. Mich. 1984).
145. See Wash. Metro. Area Transit Comm’n v. Holiday Tours, Inc., 559 F.2d 841, 843
(D.C. Cir. 1977); see also Bank of N.S. v. Pemberton, 964 F. Supp. 189, 191 (D.V.I. 1997)
(“[T]he public interest is served neither by a court system clogged with meritless appeals nor
by the waste of property which could otherwise be placed into the stream of commerce and
put to use by a new owner.”).
146. See Wash. Metro. Area Transit, 559 F.2d at 843; see, e.g., Baerwaldt, 579 F. Supp.
at 728 (holding that the injunction the plaintiffs requested was not in the public interest
because it would harm not only the defendants, but also the entire worker’s compensation
industry in Michigan); see also E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., Civil
Action No. 3:09cv58, 2012 WL 1202485, at *5 (E.D. Va. Apr. 10, 2012) (rejecting
defendant’s arguments, where defendant could not post a supersedeas bond, that denying a
stay was against public interest because of the harm enforcement would cause to the
defendant’s business, which in turn would harm its customers, and moreover, that the spirit
of competition was best served if the defendant could continue to be a viable company).
147. See Va. Petroleum Jobbers Ass’n v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 259 F.2d 921, 925 (D.C.
Cir. 1958).
148. See, e.g., Thunder Mountain Custom Cycles, Inc. v. Thiessen Prods., Inc., Civil
Action No. 06-cv-02527-PAB-BNB, 2008 WL 5412469, at *7 (D. Colo. Dec. 24, 2008);
G.G. Marck & Assocs. v. Peng, No. 3:05 CV 7391, 2008 WL 918435, at *1–2 (N.D. Ohio
Apr. 1, 2008); Blue Mountain Envtl. Mgmt. Corp. v. Chico Enters., Inc., No. Civ. A. 01-460,
2005 WL 2304999, at *1 n.2 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 21, 2005); Phansalkar v. Andersen Weinroth &
Co., 211 F.R.D. 197, 203 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); United States v. York, 909 F. Supp. 4, 10–11
(D.D.C. 1995); Gauthier v. Mardi Capital Corp., No. 90 CIV. 4313 (CSH), 1990 WL
250179, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 26, 1990).

1108

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82

making it clear that debtors are not entitled to a retroactive removal of a
lien.149 In the context of foreign jurisdiction registration, the likelihood that
the foreign court will permit a retroactive stay and extinguish liens or levies
in its jurisdiction is slim, given that it did not impose the judgment.150 The
merits of permitting retroactive stays are beyond the scope of this Note,
however, the willingness of some courts to react to the harsh effects of
executed judgments on well-meaning judgment debtors is relevant.
Phansalkar v. Andersen Weinroth & Co., a Southern District of New
York case, illustrates a situation where the detriment of enforcement to the
well-meaning judgment debtors was so great that the court permitted a
retroactive stay upon the late posting of a supersedeas bond to extinguish
the levies on the judgment debtors’ bank accounts.151 After receiving a
favorable judgment, the judgment creditor had the New York County
Sheriff serve writs of execution on the judgment debtors’ bank accounts to
secure his judgment.152 Five days later, after diligently pursuing capital for
six weeks, the debtors posted a $5.4 million supersedeas bond with the
court.153 The bond was approved and a stay was granted.154 By that time,
restraining notices had already been posted to the debtors’ bank accounts,
which prevented them from selling securities to generate the cash they
needed to post the bond.155 The debtors pleaded to the court to
retroactively stay the enforcement of the judgment, claiming that the levies
on their bank accounts were unduly interfering with their business.156 They
explained that the business’ checks were bouncing, they began receiving
threats of termination of services from their suppliers (including their
telephone service provider), they received complaints from the debtors’
employees with concerns about the debtors’ ability to pay them, and they
suffered from a deteriorating credit rating that lead to failures to refinance
some of their mortgages.157 The Southern District, noting that the judgment

149. See, e.g., Ribbens Int’l, S.A. de C.V. v. Transp. Int’l Pool, Inc., 40 F. Supp. 2d 1141,
1145 (C.D. Cal. 1999); Moses v. K-Mart Corp., 922 F. Supp. 600, 605 (S.D. Fla. 1996), aff’d
in part and rev’d in part, 136 F.3d 140 (11th Cir. 1998); Johns v. Rozet, 143 F.R.D. 11, 12–
13 (D.D.C. 1992); State Bank of Spring Hill v. Bucyrus Grain Co. (In re Bucyrus Grain
Co.), 127 B.R. 52, 55 (D. Kan. 1991); Secure Eng’g Servs., Ltd. v. Int’l Tech. Corp., 727 F.
Supp. 261, 264–65 (E.D. Va. 1989); Larry Santos Prods. v. Joss Org., 682 F. Supp. 905, 906
(E.D. Mich. 1988).
150. See, e.g., Laborers Nat’l Pension Fund v. ANB Inv. Mgmt. & Trust Co., 26 F. Supp.
2d 1048, 1051 (N.D. Ill. 1998). The plaintiffs received a favorable judgment in Texas
district court, and the defendant did not initially post a bond to stay the enforcement. Id. at
1049. After the plaintiffs registered their judgment in Illinois and filed a Citation to
Discover Assets there, the defendants posted a bond with the Texas court, and asked it to
stay the citations. Id. The Texas court granted the stay, but left the issue of the citations up
to the Illinois district court. Id. at 1050. The Illinois court ruled that the bond should not
apply retroactively to an antecedent supplementary proceeding. Id. at 1051.
151. Phansalkar v. Andersen Weinroth & Co., 211 F.R.D. 197, 203 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
152. Id. at 198.
153. Id. at 198, 200, 202.
154. Id. at 200.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 200, 202.
157. Id. at 202.
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debtors had diligently financed the bond, granted the extinguishment of the
levies to “liberate” the debtors’ property while the matter was on appeal.158
II. LOOSE ENDS: IS REGISTRATION PERMITTED WHEN AN
APPEAL IS NOT PENDING?
Pre-amendment § 1963 was problematic because it prevented registration
of a judgment, and thus enforcement, while the judgment debtor’s appeal
was pending or when the time for appeal had not yet expired.159 The 1988
amendment changed this by permitting the court that entered the judgment
to authorize registration if “good cause” existed. However, courts are split
on whether a judgment creditor must wait until the debtor has filed an
appeal before she can register her judgment elsewhere. Some courts have
held that a motion to register is premature where the judgment debtor has
not yet appealed.
Part II.A introduces Associated Business Telephone Systems Corp. v.
Greater Capital Corp., the first case to address a § 1963 motion for
registration after the 1988 amendment. Examining the legislative history of
the amendment, the court found that registration should be permitted where
there is a possibility that the judgment creditor will not be able to enforce
her judgment. Part II.B discusses the district court split regarding whether a
pending appeal is a prerequisite to registration. Part II.C introduces cases
that address motions to register a judgment after an appeal had been filed,
where the court considered the defendants’ failure to post a supersedeas
bond in its reasoning, and determined that there was good cause to register.
These cases could be read to imply that, in certain circumstances, a
judgment debtor should be given an opportunity to post a bond to avoid
registration.160
A. Associated Business: The First Case To Apply § 1963 After
the 1988 Amendment
Associated Business Telephone Systems Corp. v. Greater Capital
Corp.161 was the first case to address a 28 U.S.C. § 1963 motion after the
statute’s amendment in 1988.162 In that case, the plaintiff received a
judgment for $1.3 million from the District of New Jersey. The defendants,
who lacked assets in New Jersey, made several posttrial motions, including
a motion notwithstanding the verdict, a motion for a new trial, a request for
a remittitur, and a request for a stay of execution of judgment.163 The
plaintiff opposed these motions and sought to finalize and register its
judgment pursuant to § 1963 in California, Arizona, Tennessee, and Illinois,

158. Id. at 201–02.
159. See supra Part I.B–C.
160. See infra Part III.B.
161. 128 F.R.D. 63 (D.N.J. 1989).
162. Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 1002(a),
(b)(1), 102 Stat. 4642, 4664 (1988).
163. Associated Bus., 128 F.R.D. at 64–65.
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where it believed that the defendants did have assets.164 In deciding the
§ 1963 motion, the court analyzed the legislative history of the statute,
noting that it was originally enacted to facilitate efficient collection of
judgments by judgment creditors where judgment debtors’ assets were
outside of the rendering court’s jurisdiction without having to initiate a
second lawsuit.165 The court felt that a literal application of pre-amendment
§ 1963’s “final by appeal” requirement allowed “disingenuous” litigants to
bypass Rule 62(d)’s166 requirement that defendants post a supersedeas bond
to stay the enforcement of a judgment while on appeal.167 The court cited
the commentary to the amendment, explaining that Congress sought to
allow registration for “good cause” precisely to prevent litigants from
taking advantage of this extra time to dissipate or relocate assets.168
The defendants argued that their pending motions were meritorious, and
that the “premature” registration would be expensive to reverse if they
achieved success on their appeal.169 The court did not address the merits of
these claims, but instead determined that the “distinct possibility of [the]
plaintiff being faced with an unsatisfied judgment [was] sufficient ‘good
cause’ to order the registration.”170 The court went on to remind defendants
that the option of posting a supersedeas bond was still available to stay the
execution of the judgments, and that posting a bond with the District of
New Jersey would operate as a stay in all jurisdictions.171 The defendant’s
argument that the plaintiffs could bring an independent action on the
judgment was summarily dismissed.172 Although an independent action
was still a valid means of enforcing a judgment, it was irrelevant given that
the court had found good cause for registering the judgment.173 As § 1963
was designed to provide a shortcut around the independent action, the court
felt that the newly amended statute was crafted for precisely this
situation.174

164. Id. at 65, 68.
165. Id. at 66–67.
166. See FED. R. CIV. P. 62(d) (“If an appeal is taken, the appellant may obtain a stay by
supersedeas bond.”).
167. Associated Bus., 128 F.R.D. at 65–66.
168. See id. at 66 & n.4 (noting that the concerns expressed in the commentary were the
same as those expressed in the amendment’s House Reports).
169. Id. at 66.
170. Id. at 66–67; see also United Fire & Cas. Co. v. Coggeshall Constr. Co., No. 913159, 1991 WL 169147, at *1–2 (C.D. Ill. June 28, 1991) (holding the same where the
defendant had failed to follow a preliminary injunction requiring them to post $500,000 in
collateral with the plaintiff).
171. Associated Bus., 128 F.R.D. at 67.
172. Id.
173. Id. The court found that there was good cause because the defendants had no assets
in New Jersey, but did have assets in California, Arizona, Tennessee, and Illinois. See id. at
68.
174. Id. at 67–68.
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B. The Split
Neither the language of § 1963 nor the legislative history sheds any light
on whether a pending appeal is necessary to permit registration for good
cause.175 While many courts have relied on Professor Siegel’s commentary
to the 1988 amendment for guidance, the commentary does not answer
whether “good cause” for registration could be found before the judgment
debtor files an appeal.176 Professor Siegel’s commentary explains that
amended language “explicitly permits the registration during the appeal
period.”177 This is ambiguous, as it is unclear whether the appeal period is
the time in which an appeal is pending, or during the thirty-day period in
which a judgment debtor may file for an appeal.178 Professor Siegel also
explains that “§ 1963 gives the rendering court discretion, ‘for good cause,’
to allow the registration in the other district during the pendency of the
appeal.”179 This suggests that an appeal must be pending, but does not
explicitly exempt the scenario where a judgment debtor has not yet filed an
appeal.
With little or no guidance, courts are split on whether a pending appeal is
a prerequisite to permitting registration for good cause. Part II.B.1
introduces the cases holding that registration is only permitted after the
judgment debtor has appealed. Part II.B.2 outlines the cases finding that to
uphold the purpose of the amendment, registration should be permitted at
any time after the entry of judgment (and after the fourteen-day automatic
stay)180 for good cause shown.
1. The View That Registration for Good Cause Is Only Permitted
During Pendency of Appeals
Several courts have found that the court that entered the judgment may
only order registration after the judgment debtor has filed for an appeal. In
Educational Employees Credit Union v. Mutual Guaranty Corp., the
Eastern District of Missouri denied the judgment creditor’s motion to
register their judgment in Tennessee, finding that registration was
premature, as the defendants had not yet appealed.181 A $2 million
judgment against the defendant had been entered in May 1993, and the
defendant made two postjudgment motions that were denied: a motion for
reconsideration and motion to alter or amend the judgment.182 At the time
of the court’s decision on the motion to register in January 1994, the

175. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1963 (2006); House Subcommittee Hearings, supra note 7
(discussing the addition of the language but not defining it).
176. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1963 cmt. (West 2006).
177. Id. (emphasis added).
178. See id.; FED. R. APP. P. 4.
179. Id.
180. See FED. R. CIV. P. 62(a).
181. Educ. Emps. Credit Union v. Mut. Guar. Corp., 154 F.R.D. 233, 234 (E.D. Mo.
1994).
182. Id.
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defendant had not appealed, posted a bond, nor requested a stay of
execution while the postjudgment motions were pending.183
The plaintiff cited Associated Business184 in support of its § 1963 motion,
arguing that there was good cause for registration because the defendant
lacked assets in Missouri—the forum state—but had substantial assets in
Tennessee.185 The defendant argued that because it had not yet appealed,
the motion was premature, and the court agreed.186 Noting that case law
was “scant” on what constitutes “good cause” under § 1963, the district
court examined three cases187 that dealt with motions to register pursuant to
the post-amendment § 1963.188 Those cases, however, were not analogous,
as they dealt with registration in the context of a pending appeal.
Therefore, the Missouri court held that even if good cause was shown,
registration was premature because the defendant had not yet appealed.189
The court acknowledged that Associated Business permitted registration on
a finding of good cause regardless of whether or not an appeal was pending,
but instead ruled that the three cases had “stronger support” for only
permitting registration during an appeal.190 The court did not elaborate on
what it considered “stronger support.”
The first case that the court relied on in Educational Employees was
Chicago Downs Ass’n v. Chase, where the Seventh Circuit found good
cause to register because the defendant had no property in the forum
district, substantial assets outside the district, and declined to post a
supersedeas bond.191 The court, discussing the circumstances in which
registration would be available, spoke specifically about registration in the
context of a pending appeal.192
A court with jurisdiction to authorize execution if the appellant does not
post a bond—power a district court possesses during an appeal—also
may make the findings that under § 1963 authorize execution in another
district. The statute calls on a district judge to make ‘good cause’ findings
while an appeal is pending[.]193

Additionally, because the defendant declined to post a supersedeas bond,
the Seventh Circuit found that the district court had not abused its discretion

183. Id.
184. 128 F.R.D. 63 (D.N.J. 1989).
185. Educ. Emps., 154 F.R.D. at 235.
186. Id.
187. Chi. Downs Ass’n v. Chase, 944 F.2d 366, 371 (7th Cir. 1991); Pac. Reinsurance
Mgmt. Corp. v. Fabe, 929 F.2d 1215 (7th Cir. 1991); Johns v. Rozet, 143 F.R.D. 11, 12
(D.D.C. 1992).
188. Educ. Emps., 154 F.R.D. at 235.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Chi. Downs Ass’n, 944 F.2d at 372.
192. An analysis of this language appears infra Part III.
193. Chi. Downs Ass’n, 944 F.2d at 372 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting
Trs. of Chi. Truck Drivers v. Cent. Transp., Inc., 935 F.2d 114, 120 (7th Cir. 1991)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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in ordering registration.194 Chicago Downs had demonstrated “good cause”
for registration.195
The second case that the court relied on in Educational Employees was
Pacific Reinsurance Management Corp. v. Fabe, a case with a somewhat
complicated procedural history.196 Pacific Reinsurance was granted an
arbitration award that ordered Ohio Reinsurance Corp. to pay money into
Pacific’s escrow account.197 A California district court confirmed the
arbitration award, but Ohio Reinsurance did not pay and appealed to the
Ninth Circuit without posting the court-ordered supersedeas bond.198
Pacific subsequently registered the judgment in the Northern District of
Illinois to obtain assets held in trust for Ohio Reinsurance by another
bank.199 Several issues were appealed to the Seventh and Ninth Circuits,
and the questions posed to the Seventh Circuit mainly concerned the nature
of the assets Pacific was trying to reach.200 In its analysis, however, the
court approved of the registration, stating that because the judgment was on
appeal, registration could only be ordered for good cause.201
In the third case, Johns v. Rozet, the District Court for the District of
Columbia approved registration during a pending appeal when the
defendants did not post a bond.202 The defendants had requested a stay
pending appeal and a waiver of the supersedeas bond requirement; the stay
was granted but the court ordered that the defendants post a bond pursuant
to Rule 62(d).203 The defendants did not post a bond by the deadline, and
failed yet again to post one after the court extended the deadline by another
two weeks.204 The court determined that because the defendants declined
two opportunities to post a bond, and had no assets in the District of
Columbia but held substantial assets in California, registration was
appropriate.205
After Educational Employees, two cases, one from the Northern District
of Illinois and another from the District of Idaho, also held that a pending
appeal is necessary before registration can be authorized. The Northern
District of Illinois, with limited discussion, denied registration prior to an
appeal in Generica Ltd. v. Pharmaceutical Basics, Inc. Generica won an
arbitration award and moved to confirm the award, for an order directing
entry of final judgment, and for registration pursuant to § 1963.206 The
court approved of Pharmaceutical Basics’ response in opposition to the
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Pac. Reinsurance Mgmt. Corp. v. Fabe, 929 F.2d 1215, 1216 (7th Cir. 1991).
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 1217.
201. Id. at 1218.
202. Johns v. Rozet, 143 F.R.D. 11, 12 (D.D.C. 1992).
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 12–13.
206. Generica Ltd. v. Pharm. Basics, Inc., No. 95 C 5935, 1996 WL 535321, at *1 (N.D.
Ill. Sept. 18, 1996), aff’d, 125 F.3d 1123 (7th Cir. 1997).
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registration motion, which argued that because judgment had not been
entered at the time of briefing, an appeal was not yet possible and the
defendant did not have an opportunity to post a supersedeas bond.207
Relying on the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation in Pacific Reinsurance that
“good cause” is shown when an appeal is filed and no supersedeas bond is
posted,208 the court ruled that until an appeal has been filed “the motion is
premature and, accordingly, is denied.”209 The court noted that a bond
would make registration unnecessary, as the bond would provide sufficient
security for the creditor.210
In Blaine Larsen Processing, Inc. v. Hapco Farms, Inc., the District of
Idaho, after a thirteen-day trial, ruled in favor of the plaintiff who then
moved to register in another district.211 The defendant made several
posttrial motions, including a Rule 50(b)212 motion for a judgment as a
matter of law, or in the alternative, pursuant to Rule 59,213 a motion for a
new trial.214 The defendant also moved for a stay in the execution of the
judgment until the other motions were resolved.215
The court denied plaintiff’s § 1963 motion because the intention of the
1988 amendment was to harmonize § 1963 with Rule 62, which allows
defendants to stay the enforcement of a judgment by posting a supersedeas
bond.216 Since, the defendant had not yet appealed, they had not yet had an
opportunity to file a bond.217 Citing Siegel’s commentary, the court
explained that a court could register a judgment if “no bond is filed to back
the judgment when the appeal pends.”218 The court held that “defendant
has the option of filing a supersedeas bond under Rule 62(d), in which case
plaintiff may not register the judgment elsewhere.”219 The plaintiff would
be allowed to register if and when the defendant failed to file a supersedeas
bond.220

207. Id. at *10.
208. Pac. Reinsurance Mgmt. Corp. v. Fabe, 929 F.2d 1215, 1218–19 (7th Cir. 1991); see
also supra notes 196–201 and accompanying text.
209. Generica, 1996 WL 535321, at *10.
210. Id.
211. Blaine Larsen Processing, Inc. v. Hapco Farms, Inc., Civ. No. 97-212 E BLW, 2000
WL 35539979, at *1, *14 (D. Idaho Aug. 9, 2000).
212. FED. R. CIV. P. 50(b).
213. Id. R. 59.
214. Blaine Larsen Processing, 2000 WL 35539979, at *1.
215. Id. The court resolved the motions before it, and thus dismissed the motion for a
stay. Id. at *15.
216. Id. at *14.
217. See id.
218. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C.A § 1963 cmt. (West Supp. 1989)).
219. Id. at *14.
220. Id.
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2. The View That Registration for Good Cause Is Permitted
Anytime After Judgment
Several courts have taken the opposite view from Educational Employees
and its progeny, reading 28 U.S.C. § 1963 to permit registration anytime
after the entry of judgment. The Eastern District of Pennsylvania denied
the defendant’s petition for the court to refuse pre-appeal motions for
registration in Garden State Tanning, Inc. v. Mitchell Manufacturing
Group, Inc.221 After a four-day trial, the court entered judgment for the
plaintiff in the amount of $4.6 million, and the plaintiff immediately moved
for registration in Michigan and South Carolina.222 The defendant opposed
the motion. Citing Educational Employees as its authority, the defendant
argued that because it had not appealed but still had time to appeal,
registration could not be permitted even with good cause.223 Relying on
Associated Business, its “lengthy discussion of the legislative history,” and
the § 1963 commentary, the Garden State Tanning court determined that
upholding defendant’s interpretation of § 1963 to require a pending appeal
would “thwart[] the goal of the 1988 amendment by enabling the judgmentdebtor to remove known property from its jurisdiction, prior to the filing of
such an appeal.”224 The court also cited Whitney National Bank v. Stack,225
a case from the Eastern District of Louisiana, which suggested that a
judgment could be registered outside the jurisdiction even when the
defendant had filed a motion to amend the judgment under Rule 59 but had
not yet appealed.226
In Great American Insurance Co. v. Stephens, the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania followed its precedent in Garden State Tanning, again
granting the plaintiff’s motion for registration for good cause without an
appeal.227 The court determined there was good cause because the
defendant lacked substantial assets to satisfy the judgment in Pennsylvania,
but held assets in Alabama and Florida.228 The defendant cited Educational
Employees as authority that registration was premature.229 The court again
found the argument without merit, and held that the “legislative history of
the statute and its 1988 amendment draw into sharp focus the difficulties
which would result if Defendants’ position on the timing of registration
were adopted.”230

221. No. CIV.A. 98-4789, 2000 WL 1201372, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 4, 2000).
222. Id. at *1 n.1.
223. Id. at *1–2.
224. Id.
225. Civ. A. No. 91-1320, 1992 WL 236920, at *1 (E.D. La. Sept. 2, 1992).
226. Garden State Tanning, 2000 WL 1201372, at *1; Stack, 1992 WL 236920, at *1.
227. Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Stephens, Civil Action No. 04-3642, 2006 WL 2349991, at *3
(E.D. Pa. Aug. 11, 2006). Earlier, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania also permitted
registration when the defendant had not appealed at all. Fidelity Bank, N.A. v. Anania, Civ.
A. No. 91-4819, 1991 WL 236208, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 1, 1991).
228. Great Am. Ins., 2006 WL 2349991, at *2–3.
229. Id. at *1.
230. Id. at *2.
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In Spray Drift Task Force v. Burlington Bio-Medical Corp., the D.C.
District Court also held that a pending appeal was not a prerequisite for
registering a judgment.231 Spray Drift received an arbitration award and
sought both a judgment confirming the award and an immediate registration
of the order confirming the award.232 Spray Drift argued that there was
good cause for registration because Burlington lacked assets in the District
of Columbia but held assets in another jurisdiction.233 Burlington asserted
that an appeal was a prerequisite for registration and argued against
registration on the ground that it had not failed to post a bond, and it had not
refused to since a request to post one had not been made.234 The court drew
two inferences in order to approve the registration. First, although
Burlington had not been asked to post a supersedeas bond, it did not offer
any assurances that it would, “despite the obvious opportunity to do so
created by the filing of [its] petition [against registration].”235 The court
distinguished Burlington’s behavior from that of the defendant’s in its
decision in Cheminova A/S v. Griffin L.L.C. In Cheminova, the court
denied registration because the defendant had promised to pay the award or
post bond if so ordered.236 Second, because the court could not imagine on
what grounds Burlington would appeal because it had neither contested the
arbitration award nor its confirmation, it was unlikely that an opportunity
for Burlington to post a supersedeas bond would arise.237
The D.C. District Court also attacked the substance of Burlington’s claim
that registration could only be permitted during the pendency of an appeal.
First, it found, “The statute’s plain meaning is that a judgment may be
registered when it has become final or, at any other time, for good cause
shown.”238 Second, any cases that may have held to the contrary were
found to be nonbinding and lacking in a legitimate rationale for requiring a
pending appeal.239
Most recently, in E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Industries,
Inc., the Eastern District of Virginia also determined that a judgment could
be registered where the court found good cause, regardless of whether an
appeal was pending.240 Kolon’s motion to stay execution of final judgment
was denied as moot as to Rule 62(b) and was denied as to Rule 62(d).241
DuPont sought to register its judgment in jurisdictions outside the Eastern
231. Spray Drift Task Force v. Burlington Bio-Medical Corp., 429 F. Supp. 2d 49, 51
(D.D.C. 2006).
232. Id. at 49.
233. Id. at 50.
234. Id. at 50–51.
235. Id. at 51.
236. Id. (citing Cheminova A/S v. Griffin L.L.C., 182 F. Supp. 2d 68, 80 (D.D.C. 2002));
see infra Part II.B.2.
237. Spray Drift, 429 F. Supp. at 51.
238. Id. (emphasis added).
239. Id. (citing Educ. Emps. Credit Union v. Mut. Guar. Corp., 154 F.R.D. 233 (E.D. Mo.
1994)).
240. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., Civ. A. No. 3:09CV058, 2012
WL 1203327, at *1 (E.D. Va. Apr. 10, 2012).
241. Id.
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District of Virginia.242 The court noted that a motion for registration prior
to appeal was a scenario of first impression in the Fourth Circuit, but found
Spray Drift’s analysis, and the subsequent cases that rejected Educational
Employees, to be persuasive.243 The court also held that a literal reading of
§ 1963 meant that registration could be ordered for good cause shown at
any time.244
C. Courts Have Found Good Cause To Register When the Judgment
Debtor Has Appealed and Failed To Post a Supersedeas Bond
Many cases, although they addressed § 1963 motions to register while an
appeal was already pending, have held that good cause is established (in
part or in whole) by the judgment debtor’s failure or refusal to post a
supersedeas bond. These cases are distinguishable from those that have
permitted registration based solely on the assets test.245 These cases
suggest that, but for the failure to post a bond, the court may not have found
good cause to permit registration. At least one court has explicitly held that
the judgment debtor should be given an opportunity to post a supersedeas
bond to stay the enforcement of her judgments.
In Cheminova, the D.C. District Court explicitly required that a defendant
be given an opportunity to post a supersedeas bond prior to allowing
registration.246 The court approved Cheminova’s application for the
confirmation and enforcement of an arbitration award against Griffin, but
denied its § 1963 motion to register.247 Cheminova argued that good cause
existed to register the award because Griffin had no assets in the District of
Columbia, and had substantial assets in Georgia and Texas.248 Griffin,
opposing the registration, demonstrated that Cheminova was protected by
the final arbitration order’s provision for late payment interest, and
additionally, promised to post a supersedeas bond for the full amount if the
court so ordered.249 The court held that since a bond will usually protect
the creditor’s interest, registration should be permitted only after the debtor

242. Id.
243. Id. at *2.
244. Id. (“[T]he statute seems to contemplate registration apart from the process of
appeal.”).
245. See, e.g., HSH Nordbank AG New York Branch v. Swerdlow, 08 CIV. 6131 (DLC),
2010 WL 1957265, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 14, 2010) (“Good cause is established upon a mere
showing that the party against whom the judgment has been entered has substantial property
in the other foreign district and insufficient property in the rendering district to satisfy the
judgment.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Owen v. Soundview Fin. Grp., Inc.,
71 F. Supp. 2d 278, 278–79 (S.D.N.Y. 1999))); Becherer v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 809 F. Supp. 1259, 1275 (E.D. Mich. 1992), aff’d in part, vacated in part, rev’d
in part, 43 F.3d 1054 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding the same); Ind.-Mich. Corp. v. Sisk FertilizerLime Serv., Inc., No. 89 C 2735, 1992 WL 159150, at *1 (N.D. Ill. June 29, 1992) (same).
246. Cheminova A/S v. Griffin L.L.C., 182 F. Supp. 2d 68, 80 (D.D.C. 2002).
247. Id. at 79–80.
248. Id. at 80.
249. Id.
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refuses or fails to post a bond.250 Because Griffin had made a good faith
offer to pay the award or post a supersedeas bond if the court so ordered,
the request to register was denied.251
The Southern District of New York followed Cheminova’s precedent in
Lankler Siffert & Wohl, LLP v. Rossi when it denied registration where the
defendants promised to post a supersedeas bond.252 The defendants had
filed notice of appeal from the judgments, and the plaintiff demonstrated
good cause to register as the defendant had insufficient assets to satisfy the
judgment in New York, but held assets in the Northern District of Texas.253
Because the defendants indicated that they intended to post a bond, the
court felt that the defendant should be given an opportunity to do so, and it
deferred authorization for registration for fourteen days.254
At least seven other courts have weighed the lack of a supersedeas bond
as one factor that added to a finding of good cause for permitting
registration outside the forum jurisdiction. The District of Maryland, in
Saint Anne’s Development Co. v. Trabich and Hofmann v. O’Brien, held
that defendant’s failure to post a supersedeas bond and lack of assets in the
forum jurisdiction but existence of substantial assets in another jurisdiction,
together demonstrated sufficient good cause to order registration in the
other districts.255 The Northern District of California found good cause
where the automatic stay period had expired, the defendants failed to post a
bond after appeal, and the defendants lacked assets in California to satisfy
the judgment.256 The Tenth Circuit,257 Eastern District of Pennsylvania,258
the Eastern District of Tennessee,259 the Northern District of Illinois,260 and
the D.C. District Court261 all held the same.
250. Id. (citing Henkels & McCoy, Inc. v. Adochio, No. Civ.A. 94-3958, 1997 WL
535899, at *2 (E.D. Pa. July 31, 1997), and Johns v. Rozet, 143 F.R.D. 11, 12–13 (D.D.C.
1992)).
251. Id.
252. Lankler Siffert & Wohl, LLP v. Rossi, No. 02 Civ.10055(RWS), 2004 WL 1627167,
at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 21, 2004).
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. See Saint Anne’s Dev. Co. v. Trabich, Civ. No. WDQ-07-1056, 2010 WL 4284930,
at *2 (D. Md. Oct. 29, 2010); Hofmann v. O’Brien, Civ. No. WDQ-06-3447, 2009 WL
3216814, at *3 (D. Md. Sept. 28, 2009).
256. See Funai Elec. Co. v. Daewoo Elecs. Corp., No. C-04-1830 JCS, 2009 WL 605840,
at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2009).
257. See In re Steel Reclamation Res., Inc., No. 94-6396, 1995 WL 495272, at *3 (10th
Cir. Aug. 21, 1995) (upholding the decision of the district court to allow registration because
the defendant “had not posted a supersedeas bond and had no property in the district that the
judgment was rendered”).
258. See Henkels & McCoy, Inc. v. Adochio, No. Civ. A. 94-3958, 1997 WL 535899, at
*2 (E.D. Pa. July 31, 1997) (“In cases in which the judgment debtor has no assets in the
judgment district, but has assets in another district and refuses to post a supersedeas bond,
there is good cause to register the judgment.” (citing Jack Frost Labs., Inc. v. Physicians &
Nurses Mfg. Corp., 951 F. Supp. 51 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), and Fidelity Bank, N.A. v. Anania,
Civ.A. No. 91-4819, 1991 WL 236208, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 1, 1991))).
259. See DuVoisin v. Avery (In re S. Indus. Banking Corp.), 121 B.R. 229, 232 (Bankr.
E.D. Tenn. 1990) (“Because the defendant also has assets in Kentucky, and because there
has been no stay of execution on the judgment, good cause exists entitling the plaintiff to
[registration].”).
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III. COURTS SHOULD PERMIT A JUDGMENT TO BE REGISTERED FOR “GOOD
CAUSE SHOWN” REGARDLESS OF WHETHER AN APPEAL IS FILED, BUT NOT
BEFORE GIVING THE JUDGMENT DEBTOR AN OPPORTUNITY TO OBTAIN A
STAY BY POSTING A SUPERSEDEAS BOND
Part III.A explains that a judgment creditor should not have to wait to
register her judgment until the judgment debtor has filed an appeal. To
ensure that a judgment creditor is able to collect on the judgment to which
she is rightfully entitled, courts must permit registration as soon as the
fourteen-day automatic stay has lapsed. Part III.B proposes a caveat.
Should the creditor move for registration before the debtor’s time for an
appeal has lapsed, the court should have discretion to grant the debtor an
opportunity to post a bond, and if necessary, a few days’ time in order to
collect the requisite funding.
A. Requiring That a Judgment Creditor Wait Until the Defendant Has
Appealed Renders the Good Cause Language of § 1963 Meaningless and
Derogates from the Purpose of the Amendment
Educational Employees, Blaine Larsen, and Generica misinterpreted the
purpose of adding the “good cause” language to 28 U.S.C. § 1963 by
amendment in 1988.262 The amendment sought to eliminate the anomaly
that permitted judgment debtors to avoid registration and secure additional
time to hide or dispose of their assets.263 Further, these cases misconstrued
prior cases, such as Pacific Reinsurance.264 Educational Employees cited
Pacific Reinsurance and other cases to establish that most cases that had
considered § 1963 motions to register had done so in the context of a
pending appeal.265 This logic is flawed, however, because the judgment
creditor decides when to file a motion for registration, and the fact that the
creditors had done so after an appeal was filed in the few cases that
Educational Employees examined may have been coincidental. In any
lawsuit, it may take some time for the creditor to realize there are no assets
in the forum jurisdiction, and, moreover, it may take time to locate the
debtor’s assets in other jurisdictions. Perhaps it is not until the debtor
appeals that a creditor will feel uneasy about the ability to collect her
judgment and feel the need to register.
260. See First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Polonitza, No. 88 C 2998, 1991 WL 2408, at *2
(N.D. Ill. Jan. 4, 1991) (“This court agrees with Associated Business, Southern Industrial,
and the commentary [to the 1988 amendment of § 1963] that lack of a supersedeas bond, no
assets in this district, and substantial assets in another district constitute good cause
justifying registration of the judgment in the other district.”).
261. See Johns v. Rozet, 143 F.R.D. 11, 12–13 (D.D.C. 1992). The debtor appealed and
the court denied the request for a waiver of the bond requirement. Id. After the debtor did
not post a bond by the imposed deadline, the court granted the creditor’s motion to register
in California since the defendant’s financial statements showed the presence of assets there
and an absence of assets in the District of Columbia. Id. at 12–13.
262. See supra Part II.B.
263. See supra Part I.C.
264. See supra notes 196–201 and accompanying text.
265. See supra notes 179, 196–201 and accompanying text.
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Generica’s reading of Pacific Reinsurance for the proposition that “good
cause is shown when an appeal has been filed for which no supersedeas
bond has been posted”266 is also misleading. The Seventh Circuit limited
its discussion of “good cause” to only noting that the Ninth Circuit found
that there was “good cause” to register.267 It did not expressly approve of
or articulate the Ninth Circuit’s standard, nor did it articulate a standard of
its own.268
The purpose of the amendment was to avoid the end-run around
Rule 62(d) by providing an additional—and earlier—timeframe than what
the older version of the statute provided.269 Requiring a plaintiff to wait
until a defendant has appealed makes the “good cause shown” language
useless. Denying a motion to register (after the fourteen-day automatic stay
period) because it is premature forces a judgment creditor to wait until the
defendant has decided whether to appeal. Practically speaking, this may be
the same as waiting until the time for appeal has expired.
Requiring an appeal as a prerequisite to registration aids the judgment
debtor who wishes to take advantage of extra time to hide assets. Even
assuming that the defendant does not engage in any postjudgment motion
practice,270 if the defendant possesses no assets in the forum jurisdiction,
but substantial assets in a second jurisdiction that she wishes to hide or
dissipate, the defendant can simply wait until the very end of the thirty-day
window to file an appeal, giving her ample time to make sure there is
nothing left in the second jurisdiction for the plaintiff to claim in
enforcement of the judgment. Refusing to permit registration would allow
a judgment debtor to create a de facto stay for thirty days, doubling the
fourteen-day automatic stay.271
B. Permitting Registration Before the Debtor Has an Opportunity To Post
a Supersedeas Bond Can Give a Judgment Creditor Too Much Security, to
the Detriment of the Judgment Debtor’s Rights
Even when a defendant has already appealed or is engaged in
postjudgment motion practice, she should not be deprived of an opportunity
to post a supersedeas bond to stay the execution in the other jurisdictions.
The posting of a supersedeas bond avoids execution on property in other,
and sometimes multiple, states. Once a judgment has been registered,
taking the appropriate steps required by local state law can turn it into a lien
or levy against property there.272 The debtor can stay the enforcement by

266. See supra note 208 and accompanying text.
267. See supra notes 196–201 and accompanying text.
268. See supra notes 196–201 and accompanying text.
269. See supra Part I.C.
270. Should the defendant decide to engage in postjudgment motion practice, the court
will likely require a bond to stay the execution of the judgment while the motions are
resolved. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
271. See supra Part I.D.2.
272. See supra Part I.D.2.
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posting a bond in the rendering court, but this will not always lift the liens
or remove the registered judgment—it merely stays them.273
The effect of liens or levies, even if they do not reach personal property,
can be detrimental. For example, in Phansalkar v. Andersen Weinroth &
Co., the creditor used New York execution laws to create levies on the
judgment debtors’ bank accounts.274 The levies prevented the debtors from
selling securities to raise cash for the posting of a bond, and nearly drove
the debtors out of business as they bounced checks, nearly had their
telephone service cut off, and were rejected for a mortgage refinancing
because of a lowered credit rating.275
A judgment debtor may need additional time to secure the necessary
financing for posting a supersedeas bond. For instance, in Phansalkar, the
judgment debtors needed six weeks to secure their $5.4 million bond.276
Executing on a debtor’s property may even prevent her from being able to
secure the cash to post a bond.277 Moreover, if the judgment creditor is a
business with limited physical assets—for instance a think tank, whose
assets are mainly in the form of intellectual property—raising the funds
may take longer than it would take a business with a great deal of physical
assets and real property. For a business with limited physical assets, there
is little or no real property to mortgage against.
The central purpose of the 1988 amendment was to eliminate judgment
debtors’ ability to stay the enforcement of the judgment on appeal while
circumventing Rule 62(d)’s supersedeas bond requirement.278 While
supersedeas bonds are not mandatory,279 a judgment debtor is entitled to
post a bond to stay the enforcement of the judgment during the resolution of
her postjudgment motions, even if she has not yet appealed, and should—in
the appropriate case—be granted time to do so.280 That view is supported
by the cases that have found good cause where a judgment debtor failed to
post a supersedeas bond after requesting a stay of execution.281 Failure to
post a bond after an appeal has been filed or during the pendency of
postjudgment motions generally entitles a judgment creditor to begin
enforcement proceedings.282 However, these courts add some additional
meaning to the bond requirement by defining it as a trigger for good cause
to register. This implies that the court should use its discretion to consider
whether to delay immediate registration and authorize extra time for the
judgment debtor to post a bond.
This is the view articulated in Cheminova, which held that “permission to
register should be deferred until after a judgment debtor refuses or fails to
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.

See supra Part I.D.2.
See supra notes 151–58.
See supra notes 151–58.
See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 155–57 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.A.
See supra notes 12, 119 and accompanying text.
See supra Part I.D.2.
See supra Part II.C.
See supra Part I.D.2.

1122

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82

post a supersedeas bond.”283 Indeed, the D.C. District Court in Spray Drift
found it problematic that the defendant did not offer any assurance that it
would pay the plaintiff’s award, nor that it would comply with a court
ordered bond.284 Absent a showing that the debtor intends to hide assets,
the court should exercise its discretion to give the debtor extra time to
secure funding by examining whether the debtor has the ability to post a
bond, and the court should take a good faith promise that she will post a
bond. Judge Robert Sweet in the Southern District of New York gave
judgment debtors time to post a bond in Lankler Siffert & Wohl, LLP v.
Rossi.285 In Lankler, the defendants had not yet had an opportunity to post
a bond but stated their intention to post one. The court therefore deferred
registration of the judgment for fourteen days, noting that registration
would be authorized if no bond was posted in that time.286
Just as courts have leeway in determining what constitutes “good cause”
under the statute,287 courts confronted with a motion to register should
exercise their discretion to permit a stay without the posting of a bond,288
and conduct a balancing test to determine whether or not to grant the
judgment debtor time to post a bond before permitted registration. A useful
guideline for such a balancing test could be created from the test used by
most courts to consider whether to permit a stay without the posting of a
bond.289 Adapting the principles behind these four factors to decide
whether to allow additional time for a judgment debtor to post a bond might
work as follows. A court could weigh: (1) whether the judgment debtor
has made a strong showing that he is likely to secure the assets to post a
bond within the time allotted; (2) whether the judgment debtor will be
irreparably injured if registration is permitted without the opportunity to
post a bond; (3) whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure the
other parties interested in the proceeding; and (4) where the public interest
lies. This framework would allow a court to weigh the interest of the
creditor in collecting her judgment in a timely fashion, against the interest
of the debtor in fulfilling the judgment payment with minimal adverse
interference to the debtor’s livelihood, assets, and property. It also protects
the interests of the public, and the interests of a judgment debtorcorporation’s or debtor-business’s customers.290
CONCLUSION
This Note provides direction for district courts in evaluating when it is
appropriate to order registration for good cause shown pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1963. Some district courts have held that registration for good
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.

See supra notes 247–51 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 234–36 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 252–54 and accompanying text.
See supra note 254 and accompanying text.
See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 119–21.
See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 145–47.
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cause shown cannot be ordered prior to the time when the judgment debtor
files an appeal, while others have permitted registration any time after the
entry of judgment and expiration of the automatic stay. This Note argues
that registration should be ordered for good cause shown anytime after the
automatic stay expires, but that the judgment debtor should be given an
opportunity, and if necessary, time, to post a supersedeas bond to stay the
enforcement of the judgment during the resolution of her postjudgment
motions or during the pendency of her appeal. Registration is a powerful
tool for judgment creditors in securing assets to satisfy their judgments.
That tool is blunted, however, when permission to register is cabined to the
period after an appeal has been filed. On the other side of the scale, courts
must be wary of the potential for registration to tie up assets unnecessarily,
and should give well-meaning judgment debtors an opportunity to furnish a
supersedeas bond to secure the creditor’s judgment.

